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1. Introduction
The present contribution intends to pursue the analysis of the effects of the evolutionary 
metaphor (Dosi, 1988; Freeman, 1986; Nelson and Winter, 1982) when applied inside 
the domain of economic geography. in principle, the validity of the assumption of evolu-
tionary economics is all but obvious and the question of whether economic interactions 
can be effectively thought of as an evolutionary process still open. With the clear risk of 
oversimplifying the matter, we could say that the notion of evolution immediately entails 
three consequences for the economic dynamics. First, it should move from simpler to 
more complex structures. Second, it should progressively eliminate less efficient struc-
tures and promote the development of more efficient ones, irrespectively of the fact that 
this process of elimination and promotion might take place through a mechanism of 
adaptation by some of the economic actors or through an ‘adoptation’ by some of the 
markets and institutions (Alchian, 1950). Third, the progressive change or renewal of the 
different actors and rules should proceed in a jointly integrated way.
Obviously, the central question is not whether the characteristics described above can 
be considered to be present in economic systems, because they certainly are. The ques-
tion is whether the evolutionary accounting of their effects and causes allows for a deeper 
understanding and a more reliable modeling of economic interactions. in the end, one is 
interested to know if this accounting could help in the development of more effective poli-
cies. in principle, however, the ideas of evolutionary economic thinking can be applied to 
the investigation of the different domains of economics also without providing a certain 
and indisputable answer to the previous question. Indeed, partly following, even if not 
subscribing to, the friedmanian idea that the effectiveness of a theoretical framework 
should be solely judged on its ability to reproduce and explain observed phenomena, one 
could simply start from the ‘evolutionary’ metaphor and see what consequences it brings 
to the design of economic models. As argued in Frenken and Boschma (2007), the devel-
opment of an evolutionary approach to economic geography could suggest new ways 
of explaining the observed patterns that characterize the uneven spatial distribution of 
economic activities. In the spirit of the foregoing ‘minimalistic’ research agenda, we try 
to complement the bottom- up theorizing suggested there with a deeper understanding of 
the differences that an evolutionary inspired modeling is likely to produce with respect to 
more traditional approaches.
To be brought to its completion our exercise requires a twofold specification. First, 
we need to identify a simple formal model, based on clear assumptions, which can serve 
as a generic analytical framework. Second, we have to consider which hypotheses are to 
be put forward in order to imbue this model with the spirit of evolutionary economic 
geography. We address the first requirement by choosing, as a starting point, the simple 
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two- location and multi- firm model described in Krugman (1991). This model already 
encompasses the idea of increasing returns and of the relevance of feedback mechanisms 
in shaping the aggregate economic pattern. it is well rooted in the tradition of new eco-
nomic geography and, as such, constitutes a perfect benchmark for our comparative 
exercise. Concerning the second requirement, in line with the discussion in Boschma 
and Frenken (2006) and Boschma and Martin (2007), and partly inspired by the critical 
survey in Martin (1999), we assume the following three aspects as baseline characters of 
our evolutionary modeling. first, the interaction between economic agents should take 
place not only through market mechanisms, but also through localized, idiosyncratic 
interactions. Second, the flow of time should be present in the model and the decisions 
of economic agents, together with their consequences, should be put in an explicit time 
dimension. Third, the heterogeneity of firms’ behavior should not be captured by a 
simple ‘noise’ term acting as a perturbation around a deterministic equilibrium. Rather, 
it should enter as an essential ingredient in the description of the model and in the deter-
mination of the final aggregate outcome (Granovetter, 1978; Schelling, 1978).
more precisely, we take as a starting point the model introduced in forslid and 
Ottaviano (2003) and developed in Bottazzi and Dindo (2008). The latter extends 
Krugman (1991) by introducing a positive technological externality, assumed not trada-
ble across locations, and by considering workers who are not mobile, which is equivalent 
to assuming that firms’ locational decisions and the reallocation of capital goods take 
place over a much shorter time scale than the one characterizing work- force flows. inside 
this simple economy, we consider a heterogeneous population of profit maximizing firms 
that independently choose where to locate their production. The model is characterized 
by a simple entry–exit process, and we consider a truly dynamic setting in which the 
locational decision of each firm is affected by the past decisions of others. As in Bottazzi 
et al. (2007), we assume that firms keep revising their decisions as new locational choices 
affect their profits. As we shall see, this updating choice process is able to generate a self-
 reinforcement mechanism similar to that described in Dosi and Kaniovski (1994).
The idea that localized externalities might explain agglomeration even in the absence 
of workers’ mobility, has been explored by several contributions inside new economic 
geography literature. For instance Krugman and Venables (1996) assume a vertically 
structured economy with localized input–output linkages, while martin and ottaviano 
(1999) consider location- specific R&D sectors that introduce different products in dif-
ferent locations. Baldwin and Forslid (2000) consider geographical distributions of eco-
nomic activities as driven by a growth process fueled by human capital accumulation and 
knowledge spillovers. A drawback of these works is that, in general, they derive equi-
libria conditions without the complete and explicit characterization of firms’ profit func-
tions. This specification becomes however necessary when one has to design the choice 
procedure of firms in a dynamic environment. In order to obtain explicit expression for 
the profit function, we take a simpler approach: we introduce technological externalities 
in the form of a baseline ‘cost sharing’ assumption, according to which fixed production 
costs are shared across all firms within a given location.
The cost sharing assumption makes the model in Bottazzi and Dindo (2008) particu-
larly suitable for the present exercise because, while remaining simple and analytically 
tractable, it allows for a twofold dependence of firm profits on the activity of the other 
firms. Using the terminology of Scitovsky (1954), this dependence takes the form of both 
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a pecuniary externality and a technological externality. In this way, firms’ profits depend 
on the interplay of an indirect interaction mediated by the market, which corresponds to 
a pecuniary externality, and a localized direct interaction, which corresponds to a tech-
nological externality. as it turns out, the former acts against the creation of production 
clusters while, by assumption, the latter promotes them.
Inside this framework, we analyze an explicit firms locational decision process. Our 
aim is to characterize the long run geographical distribution emerging from this process 
and relate it to the interplay of the two forms of externality. Since we explicitly intro-
duce the time dimension in our analysis, we are also able to address history dependent 
phenomena. in particular, we are able to investigate how the initial state of the economy 
affects firms’ decisions and to show that, because of firms’ heterogeneity, when agglom-
eration occurs it is characterized by a transient nature.
This chapter is organized as follows. in section 2 we briefly describe the model and 
its assumptions. in section 3 we study the static setting, and derive the geographical 
distribution when the model is solved by assuming instantaneous equilibrium between 
firms choices. Starting from the previously identified equilibria, section 4 introduces both 
heterogeneity in agents’ decisions and an explicit dynamics across time, discussing what 
kind of differences are observed with respect to the static case. finally section 5 summa-
rizes our main findings and suggests some possible further developments.
2. The model
The following model is a simplification of that described in Bottazzi and Dindo (2008), 
where more details can be found. consider a two- location economy. in each location 
there are live I households.1 Each household is a ‘local’ worker, that is, he supplies labor 
to firms located where he resides, and a ‘global’ consumer, that is, he can buy goods 
produced in both locations and traded in a global market. The economy has two sectors: 
manufacturing and agriculture. in both sectors production is localized. The agricultural 
good is homogeneous, whereas the manufacturing good is made by differentiated prod-
ucts. location l =1, 2 has nl manufacturing firms and the total number of firms is n1 + n2 
= N. Without loss of generality, we assume that N is even. in order to consume manufac-
turing goods produced in the location where they do not reside, consumers have to pay 
a transportation cost t [ (0, 1], which takes the form of an iceberg cost: for each unit 
of good shipped, only a fraction t arrives at the destination. This is equivalent to saying 
that consumers pay a price p/t for each unit of good they have to import. The higher the 
value of t, the lower the cost of transporting the goods. agricultural goods are traded at 
no costs. Agents’ consumption behavior is specified by the following
Assumption 1: each agent chooses among the agricultural goods and the N different 
manufacturing products so as to maximize the following utility function:
 U 5 C 12mA C mM (24.1)
where the utility of bundle CM is of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) type,
 CM 5 a a
i51,N
c
s21
s
i b
s
(s21)
  s . 1 (24.2)
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and each product ci is produced by a different firm i =1,. . .,N .
assumption 1 implies that the N products are substitutes and that s is the mutual 
elasticity of substitution (see Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). The higher s, the more the prod-
ucts are substitutes and the more impact on price differences consumers demand. Since, 
because of CES utility, agents value diversity, we have implicitly assumed that each firm 
produces a different product, so that N is both the number of manufacturing firms and 
the number of manufacturing products available for consumption.
The agricultural sector uses only labor as an input under constant returns to scale with 
unitary marginal costs. because of the large number of potential producers, 2I(1 − µ) at 
equilibrium, the agricultural market is perfectly competitive and the agricultural good is 
sold at its marginal cost.
Also manufacturing firms use only labor as input and their technologies are character-
ized by a common, industry- specific, marginal cost and a local, location- specific, fixed 
cost. formally this leads to assumption 2.
Assumption 2: The labour vi that each firm i = 1, . . ., N needs to produce an amount yi 
of output is given by:
 vi 5 byi 1 ali (24.3)
where marginal cost b is constant across firms and across locations and the fixed costs ali 
depend on the location li occupied by firm i.
assumption 2 implies that we are in the presence of economies of scale, that is, an 
increase in output causes a decrease in each firm’s average costs. Firm i profit is given 
by:
 pi = pi yi − wivi = yi( pi − wi b) − wiali,  i = 1,. . ., N (24.4)
where wi is firm i cost of labor.
Before looking for markets’ equilibria notice that, because of perfect competition 
and constant returns to scale in agricultural production, agricultural wages are equal to 
agricultural prices. moreover, because of zero transportation costs for the agricultural 
goods, agricultural prices, and thus wages, must be the same in both locations. Given 
that consumers are not mobile and the economy is at an equilibrium, it should also make 
no difference for a worker to work in the agricultural or in the manufacturing sector. 
As a result wages in the two sectors, and in the two locations, are equal. For this reason 
it is convenient to use wages to normalizes prices in the economy and set wi = 1 for 
all i.
In order to find equilibrium prices, quantities, profits in the manufacturing sector, and 
the resulting geographical distribution of firms, one should in principle analyze each of 
the N product markets. Nevertheless the problem can be simplified by considering only 
one representative market for each location. In fact, location by location, firms produce 
using the same technology, face the same demand (because of Assumption 1 all goods are 
substitutes), and the same labor supply. This implies that equilibrium prices, quantities 
and wages are the same for all the firms in a given location. We can thus consider only 
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two representative product markets, one for each location l, rather than the N distinct 
products.
We shall compute market equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits for each fixed 
 distribution of firms, that is, fixing n1 and n2. First, exploiting the CES preference structure 
(24.2), which gives a constant elasticity of demand, and assuming that the market struc-
ture is that of monopolistic competition, we derive firms’ pricing behavior. Then using 
households’ budget constraints we compute their total demand for the goods produced 
in each location, taking into account that all goods are substitutes and transportation 
costs impact the prices of foreign goods. Setting supply equal to demand we are able 
to determine equilibrium quantities and firms’ profits in each location as a function of 
n1 and n2. These expressions are used, in the next section, to assess firms’ geographical 
distribution.
Let us start from firms’ pricing behavior. Consistently with our assumptions, the 
market structure is that of monopolistic competition, that is, each firm maximizes its 
profits, setting its marginal revenue equal to its marginal costs, given market demand 
elasticity and irrespective of other firms’ behavior. Using profit function (24.4) and sub-
stituting (24.3) while setting marginal profit to zero gives:
 pla1 1 1eb 5 b (24.5)
where e = ∂ log c/∂ log p is the demand elasticity. Given assumption 1, it holds that:
 e = −s
which together with (24.5) implies:
 pl 5 b
s
s 2 1 (24.6)
Since the price does not depend on the location index, local prices are equal and it holds 
p1 = p2.
Denote the quantity demanded by an agent who reside in location l of a product pro-
duced in location m as dlm. each demand can be determined as a function of prices and 
wages using the fact that relative demands under a CES utility satisfy:
 
d11
d12
5 a p2
p1t
bs   and d22
d21
5 a p1
p2t
bs (24.7)
while agents’ budget constraints give:
 µ
m 5 n1d11p1 1 n2d12
p2
t
m 5 n1d21
p1
t 1 n2d22p2
 (24.8)
where, given the Cobb- Douglas formulation in (24.1), µ is the share of agents’ (unitary) 
income used to buy manufacturing goods. Solving for the demands, one finds:
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 d11 5
m
n1p1 1 n2ps1p12s2 ts21
    d12 5
mts
n1p12s1 ps2 1 n1p2ts21
 d22 5
m
n1p12s1 ps2ts21 1 n2p2
    d21 5
mts
n1p1ts21 1 n2ps1p12s2
 (24.9)
Equating, location by location, firms’ supply and consumers’ demand, gives:
 µ
y1 5 Id11 1
Id21
t
y2 5 Id22 1
Id12
t
 (24.10)
where t discounts the demand of imported goods. Plugging (24.9) in (24.10) and using 
(24.6) one can solve for market equilibrium quantities:
 µ
y1 5
Im (s 2 1)
bs a
1
n1 1 n2ts21
1
ts21
n1ts21 1 n2
b
y2 5
Im (s 2 1)
bs a
1
n2 1 n1ts21
1
ts21
n2ts21 1 n1
b
 (24.11)
Profits in each location can now be found using the latter expression together with (24.4) 
and (24.6). Introducing the fraction of firms in location 1, x = n1/N (so that n2 = (1 − x)N), 
and normalizing the level of wages to one, profits can be finally written as a function of x:
 µ
p1 (x) 5
Im
Nsa
1
x 1 (1 2 x)ts21 1
ts21
xts21 1 (1 2 x) b 2 a1
p2 (x) 5
Im
Nsa
1
xts21 1 (1 2 x) 1
ts21
x 1 (1 2 x)ts21b 2 a2
 (24.12)
Each location- specific profit function in (24.12) has a positive term proportional to 
the total demand for goods produced in that location and a negative term equal to the 
location- specific fixed costs. In turn, the total demand has a domestic component, the first 
term in the parentheses, and an import component, the second term in the parenthesis. 
Both components depend on firms’ geographical distribution and transportation costs. 
When the transportation cost is zero, t = 1, they are equal irrespective of firms’ distribu-
tion. When the transportation cost increases, the domestic component increases, as local 
consumers substitute foreign goods with local ones. for the same reason, the export com-
ponent decreases. For any given positive transportation cost, when local firm concentra-
tion increases, the local component decreases as agents have more local goods to consume, 
all at the same price. in the same situation the export component increases, because foreign 
consumers have fewer local goods to consume and find it convenient to import more. 
The net effects of the transportation cost on the relative profits of the two locations are 
appraised in the next section. however, even without knowing this effect, it can immedi-
ately be seen that market forces make the average profits independent of transportation 
costs. indeed one has the following:
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Proposition 1  Consider an economy with two locations, l = 1, 2, and N firms, where 
Assumptions 1–2 are valid. The average firms’ profit p does not depend on 
transportation costs and is given by:
 p 5
2Im
Ns 2 xa1 2
(1 2 x)a2 (24.13)
Proof. See Appendix.
if now one assumes that a1 = a2, sine location- specific indexes have disappeared from 
any variable, only market forces are at work and our model becomes close to the one of 
Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). Following Bottazzi and Dindo (2008) we take a different 
route.
Before doing so, a last remark is necessary concerning the general equilibrium setting. In 
our framework, labor and goods markets are at equilibrium only when total firms’ profits 
are zero, and only provided that the demand for labor in both locations is not higher 
than I. Concerning the former condition, notice that profits are already zero for the com-
petitive agricultural firms but not necessarily so for manufacturing firms. Nevertheless 
it is possible to set zero profit for the manufacturing sector, imposing a long- run equi-
librium condition on the size of the economy. We shall do so in assumption 4 below. 
concerning the latter condition, one has that, because of labor market segmentation 
(no mobility), labor demand in both locations should be lower than I. Straightforward 
computations show that this amounts to imposing a restriction on the preferences for 
manufacturing goods, namely µ < s/(2s − 1), which we will assume to hold from now 
on.2 as a result, provided that preferences for manufacturing goods are not too strong 
and on imposing a long- run zero profit condition on the number of firms, prices and 
quantities as in (24.6) and (24.11) guarantee that both labor and good markets are at 
equilibrium.
Technological externalities
By retaining a dependency of the fixed cost a on the location index, we introduce a local-
ized technological externality because of direct firms’ interaction, that is, not mediated 
by market forces (Scitovsky, 1954).
Assumption 3: ‘Cost sharing’ hypothesis. Firms’ fixed costs al decrease with the number 
of firms located in l according to:
 a1 5
a
2x1
,   where xl 5
nl
N
, l [ {0, 1} (24.14)
assumption 3 represents a positive technological externality in the form of a baseline 
‘cost sharing’: the larger the number of firms in one location, the lower the fixed costs 
these firms bear in the production activity. Since the fixed cost paid by firms in a given 
location decreases proportionally with the number of firms populating that location, the 
total fixed cost paid remains, location by location, constant. This effect can be thought of 
as an up- front cost paid to improve access to skilled labor, the more firms in one location 
the smaller each firm’s investment in training, or as a cost for services or infrastructure 
use, which is evenly shared among all the active firms in one location.
An important feature of the specific form of ‘cost sharing’ introduced in Assumption 3 
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is that it doesn’t modify the total fixed costs paid by the industry. This has consequences 
on the computation of firms’ average profit.
Corollary 1  Consider an economy with two locations, l = 1, 2, and N firms, where 
Assumptions 1–3 are valid. Total fixed costs in each location are equal to 
aN/2. The average firms’ profit p does not depend either on the distribution 
of firms x or on transportation cost t and is given by:
 p 5
2Im
Ns 2 a (24.15)
Proof. See Appendix.
Before we start to look for geographical equilibria, that is, those spatial distributions of 
firms where they have no incentives to change location, notice that, without restrictions 
on the parameters’ values, there could exist economies characterized by negative profits. 
In this case, we would expect firms to exit the economy. On the other hand, if profits 
were positive we could expect firms to enter the economy. As we consider the number 
of firms N in the model as given, if there are no barriers to entry, it seems reasonable to 
set the number N to a level that implies zero profits. By force of Corollary 1 this can be 
done also without knowing the geographical equilibrium distribution. Indeed profits at 
a geographical equilibrium must be equal to average profits, and average profits (24.15), 
because of corollary 1, are independent on the geographical distribution x. moreover, 
as we have explained at the end of the previous subsection, zero total profits are needed 
in order to guarantee that all markets are at an equilibrium. All together, it is enough to 
have the following assumption.
Assumption 4: The number of firms N is such that profits at a geographical equilibrium 
are zero, that is:
 N 5
2Im
sa  (24.16)
even if, by construction, the previous assumption implies p = 0, outside the geograph-
ical equilibrium profits can be both positive or negative so that their differential gives 
firms the incentive to relocate. Before moving to the analysis of these incentives and to 
the characterization of the geographical equilibria, it is useful to rewrite profits (24.12) 
incorporating assumptions 3–4:
 µ
p1 (x) 5
a
2
a 1
x 1 (1 2 x)ts21 1
ts21
xts21 1 (1 2 x) b 2
a
2x
p2 (x) 5
a
2
a 1
xts21 1 (1 2 x) 1
ts21
x 1 (1 2 x)ts21b 2
a
2(1 2 x)
 (24.17)
Given the firms’ production costs a, the products’ elasticity of substitution s and the 
transportation cost t, the distribution of firms between the two locations, x, determines, 
through (24.17), the levels of profit. Notice that in (24.17), differently from (24.12), 
both the demand driven term and the fixed cost term are functions of the geographi-
cal distribution of firms. The first dependence is mediated by market forces (pecuniary 
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 externality), whereas the second dependence is brought in by the ‘cost sharing’ hypoth-
esis (technological externality).
3. Geographical equlibria
In this section we investigate the static geographical equilibria of the system, that is, 
those distributions of firms x such that, in the search for higher profits, each firm located 
in 1 has no incentives to move to 2 and vice versa. Geographical equilibria can be of two 
types: ‘border’ equilibria and ‘interior’ equilibria. A border equilibrium occurs when 
firms concentrate in one location, say 1, and profits in 1 are higher than profits in 2. As 
all the firms are in 1, no other firm can respond to this difference in profit opportunities. 
Candidates for border equilibria are x = 1, when all firms are in 1, and x = 0, when all 
firms are in 2. Conversely, an interior equilibrium occurs when firms distribute between 
the two locations, that is x [ (0, 1), profit levels are equal in both regions, and firms do 
not have any incentive to change their location. Using profits in (24.17) we will derive 
results for the existence and uniqueness of geographical equilibria, border and interior, 
for all the different parameterizations of the economy. This static3 analysis, which owes 
considerably to Bottazzi and Dindo (2008) where more details can be found, is useful 
to understand the interplay of pecuniary and technological externalities and constitutes 
a useful step for the development of the evolutionary dynamic analysis of the next 
section.
The respective role of each externality in determining profit differentials and thus the 
aggregate geographical equilibrium can be judged by looking at the shape of the profit 
functions and by keeping in mind that, because of transportation costs, local prices are 
lower than foreign prices, and thus local demand impacts firms’ level of output more 
than foreign demand. consider the pecuniary externality term alone, for example, set 
a = 0 in (24.17). For definiteness, consider profits in 1 (results for profits in 2 follow in 
the same way). For small x, that is, few firms in location 1 and many firms in location 2, 
each firm in 1 faces high local demand and low foreign demand. Because of the different 
impact of local and foreign demand, the level of output of firms in 1 is high and profits 
are high too. as x increases, the local demand for these firms decreases, so that profits 
decrease too. As the concentration of firms in 1 increases further, for a sufficiently large 
value of x, the demand coming from the consumers in 2, where very few firms are left, is 
more and more directed to 1 and the profits and the profits of firms located in 1 increase 
again. Profits are thus U- shaped, with p1(x)|a=0 first decreasing and then increasing in x. 
Since a firm makes the most profits when alone in one location, we have p1(x = 0)|a=0 > 
p1(x = 1)|a=0 so that the border distributions 0 and 1 are never an equilibrium. In fact, 
when all firm’s are located in one region it is always more profitable to move to the other 
region. If the transportation cost is increased (decreased), the variation in profits as a 
function of x is more (less) pronounced but the general shape of the profit function is pre-
served. as a result, the overall agglomeration effect of the pecuniary externality is always 
‘negative’, in the sense that it works against concentration of production.
The above picture changes completely when one considers also the technological 
externality terms introduced by the ‘cost sharing’ assumption, that is, a > 0 in (24.17). 
The panels in figure 24.1 show graphs of p1(x) and p2(x) in this case. Profits are given 
by the superposition of a monotonically increasing technological externality to the 
U- shaped market- driven pecuniary externality term. With low transportation costs (high 
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t) the profit function is essentially determined by the ‘cost sharing’ term and is monot-
onically increasing with decreasing marginal profits (upper panels of Figure 24.1). In this 
case, when firms’ concentration is low, firms do not benefit from the technological exter-
nality and their profits are low too, but when concentration increases, profits increase 
monotonically as firms exploit the ‘cost sharing’ opportunity. The more the firms in one 
location, the lower the positive contribution of an extra firm locating there, so that the 
marginal profit decreases. With high transportation costs (low t) the shape of the profit 
function is still monotonic (bottom panels of Figure 24.1), but marginal profits are first 
decreasing and then increasing. With low firm concentration the technological externality 
dominates and marginal profits are decreasing. As the concentration increases, the posi-
tive effect of the cost sharing is almost offset by the negative market interaction, which 
acts as a constraint on the local demand faced by firms. In this case, even if profits are 
still increasing the marginal profit is almost zero. As the concentration of firms increases 
further, profits increase more steadily because low local demand is now compensated by 
the foreign demand, so that the contribution of the pecuniary externality is positive too. 
Judging from figure 24.1, irrespective of the transportation costs, the positive effect of 
technological externalities dominates the negative effect of pecuniary externalities: firms 
make most profits by agglomerating on one side and border distributions are always an 
equilibrium. This is formalized in Proposition 2.
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Figure 24.1  Location profits (24.17) as a function of firms’ geographical distribution for 
different values of the transportation cost t. Other parameters are s = 4 and 
a = 1
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Proposition 2  Consider an economy with two locations, l = 1, 2 where Assumptions 1–4 
are valid. Call x the fraction of firms located in 1. There always exist two, 
and only two, geographical equilibria given by the border distribution 
x*1 5 1 and x*0 5 0. In particular, the unique distribution where profits are 
equal, x* = 0.5, is never an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
According to the previous proposition, the distribution with half of the firms located 
in 1 and the other half located in 2, which is the unique case where p1 = p2, is never a geo-
graphical equilibrium: even if profits are equal, incentives are such that firms move away 
and agglomerate. Only when all firms are located either in 1 or 2 are there no incentives 
to change location.
Notice that, even if transportation costs do affect the shape of each location’s profit 
function, they have no impact in characterizing the geographical equilibria of the 
economy. conversely, as we shall see in the following section, transportation costs 
play a major role in shaping the results of the evolutionary model, even in the long 
run.
4. Evolutionary firm dynamics
in the previous section we have shown that, when the technological externality term is 
introduced, firms agglomerate in one of the two locations, irrespective of transporta-
tion costs t or the relevance of technological spillover as dependent on a. This abrupt 
behavior would prescribe that any sector in which even a minimal level of localized non-
 pecuniary externalities operate should display a so- called core–periphery structure. This 
is clearly at odds with empirical observations. notice that this conclusion would remain 
a fortiori valid if instead we had considered workers’ mobility with endogenous wage 
setting, thus introducing a feedback effect that reduces (or inverts) the push of pecuni-
ary externalities towards a symmetric geographical distribution. This effect ultimately 
reinforces the conclusion that in the presence of technological spillovers only a core–
periphery structure represents an equilibrium. We end up in the uncomfortable situation 
of having a single possible equilibrium, implying the impossibility of performing an 
empirical analysis or deriving policy implications. a possible way out from this impasse, 
as we will show, is to extend the notion of geographical equilibrium to include an explicit 
dynamics describing firms’ locational decisions. The foregoing analysis is, indeed, essen-
tially static and thus silent on the results of firms’ interactions out of equilibrium. As a 
consequence, it is not clear what happens when the initial concentration of firms is not 
at an equilibrium level; in particular, whether one should expect firms to agglomerate in 
location 1 or in location 2.
in this section we extend our analysis by introducing heterogeneity in preferences at 
the single firm level and by explicitly modeling firms’ decisions in time, that is, by allow-
ing for a dynamic location- specific mechanism. Suppose that the individual utility of firm 
i derived from locating in li can be written as:
 pi = pli + ei,li (24.18)
where pli are as in (24.17) and ei,li represents an idiosyncratic profit component intended 
to capture firm- specific characteristics, like differences in productive efficiency leading to 
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different fixed costs or individual preferences for one particular location, because of, for 
instance, existing social linkages. At every time step a firm is randomly chosen to exit the 
economy. At the same time a new firm enters and chooses whether to be located in 1 or in 
2 by comparing the individual utilities in (24.18). As long as the distribution of ei,l across 
firms is well behaved (see Bottazzi and Secchi, 2007; Bottazzi et al., 2008, for details) the 
resulting probability of choosing l is given by:
 probl 5
epl
ep1 1 ep2
, l [ {1, 2} (24.19)
The fact that the locational choice is probabilistic derives from the assumption that the 
new entrant possesses preferences, or faces costs, that are not fixed, but contain an indi-
vidual component that is randomly extracted from a given distribution.
When the probability of choosing location l is given by (24.19), Bottazzi and Secchi 
(2007) show that, if the exponentials of profits are linearly changing in the number of 
firms, it is possible to compute the long- run stationary distribution of the entry–exit 
process. Thus, to exploit this result we need a linearized version of the exponential profit 
functions. We can naturally obtain it as the deviation from the middle point x* = 0.5, 
that is, the unique point where profits are equal.
Proposition 3  Consider an economy with two locations, l = 1, 2, where Assumptions 1–4 
are valid. Denote the linearization of location l exponential profits around 
x* =0.5 as cl, and the number of firms in location l as nl. Linearized expo-
nential profits are given by:
 cl = a + bnl,     l =1, 2  (24.20)
where:
 a 5 1 2
4ats21
(1 1 ts21) 2
 b 5
4a2sts21
Im (1 1 ts21) 2 (24.21)
Proof. See Appendix.
We shall call the term a in (24.21) the ‘intrinsic profit’. This is the part of the common 
profit that is entirely dependent on exogenously given characteristics of the location. 
conversely, the coefficient b in (24.21) captures the marginal contribution of a firm to the 
profit level of the location in which it resides. We shall call it the ‘marginal profit’.4 in our 
case, this coefficient captures the total effect of pecuniary and technological externalities. 
because of the leading effect of the latter it is always positive but, because of the presence 
of market mediated interactions, it is dependent on transportation costs. Specifically, 
the marginal profit is increasing with the value of t. When transportation costs are high 
(low t) each firm’s marginal contribution to the location profit is small, whereas when 
transportation costs are low (high t ) the marginal contribution is large.
Given the linearization in (24.20), the following proposition characterizes the long- run 
geographical equilibrium distribution.
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Proposition 4  Consider an economy with two locations, l =1, 2, where Assumptions 1–4 
are valid. The economy is populated by N firms, distributed according to n = 
(n1, n2). At the beginning of each period of time a firm is randomly selected, 
with equal probability over the entire population, to exit the economy. Let 
m [{1, 2} be the location affected by this exit. After exit takes place, a 
new firm enters the economy and, conditional on the exit that occurred in 
m, has a probability:
 probl 5
a 1 b(n1 2 dl,m)
2a 1 bN
of choosing location l, where a and be are given by (24.1). This process admits a unique 
stationary distribution:
 p (n) 5 N!C
(N, a, b)
Z(N, a, b) q
2
l51
1
nl!
 nl (a, b)  (24.22)
where:
 C(N, a, b) 5 2a 1 a1 2 1
N
bbN (24.23)
 n (a, b) 5 eq
n
h51
[a 1 b(h 2 1) ] n . 0
1 n 5 0
 (24.24)
and Z(N, a, b) is a normalization factor which depends only on the total number of firms N, 
and the coefficients a and b.
Proof. See Propositions 3.1–3.4 of Bottazzi and Secchi (2007).
figure 24.2 shows results from a simulation of the entry–exit process for two different 
values of the transportation cost t. The left panel shows 50,000 iterations of the process, 
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Figure 24.2  Entry–exit process for different values of the transportation costs. Left 
panel: 50,000 simulations of the entry–exit process for different values of the 
transportation cost t . Right panel: Long- run stationary distribution of the 
entry–exit process simulated in the left panel. In both panels the parameters 
are s = 4, a = 1, µ =0.5 and I = 800
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whereas the right panel plots the corresponding long- run distributions as characterized 
by proposition 4.
With low transportation costs (t = 0.95) the long- run distribution is clustered around 
the two extreme values, x = 0 and x = 1, confirming the prediction of the static analysis. 
However, the simulation of the entry–exit process (left panel of Figure 24.2) shows that 
agglomeration is only a meta- stable state. one location can become much larger than 
the other for several time steps, like location 2 which, in the simulation shown, attracts 
almost all firms in the periods between 2000 and 3500, but at some point the cluster 
abruptly disappears and the other location can take over. This behavior is well in accord-
ance with the bimodal nature of the equilibrium distribution (see right panel of Figure 
24.2). In fact, the equilibrium distribution represents the unconditional probability of 
finding the system in a give state. This probability can thus be very different from the 
frequency with which this particular state is observed over a finite time window.
Conversely, for higher transportation costs (t =0.7), agglomeration is ‘almost’ never 
observed: firms spatial distribution is now fluctuating around x* =0.5 (see left panel of 
Figure 24.2). Even if the static analysis predicts agglomeration, the equilibrium distribu-
tion of the stochastic system, reported in the right panel of figure 24.2, shows that the 
most likely geographical distribution has an equal number of firms per location, irre-
spective of the fact that the point x* = 0.5 is never a static geographical equilibrium. In 
general one has the following:
Proposition 5  Consider the entry and exit process described in Proposition 4. When the 
marginal profit is bigger than the intrinsic profit, b > a, the stationary dis-
tribution (24.22) is bimodal with modes in x = 0 and x = 1; when b < a the 
stationary distribution is unimodal with mode in x = 0.5; and when a = b 
the stationary distribution is uniform.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given our dynamic locational decision process, the previous proposition clarifies that 
the shape of the geographical equilibrium distribution does ultimately depend on the 
relative size of the marginal profit b and the intrinsic profit a. When marginal profits are 
bigger than intrinsic profits the distribution has mass on the borders of the [0, 1] interval. 
When marginal profits are lower than intrinsic profits the distribution has higher mass 
in the middle of this interval, and when they are equal every value of the geographical 
distribution is as likely.
rewriting the relation b _ a in Proposition 5 using the definitions of a and b in (24.21), 
it is straightforward to derive the conditions for the unimodality or bimodality of (24.22) 
in terms of the values of t, I, µ, and a:
 4aa1 1 as
Im b _
(1 1 ts21) 2
ts21
The left panels of Figures 24.3 and 24.4 have been obtained using the latter inequality: 
they show which distributional shape is observed in the different regions of the plane 
(I, t) and (a, t) respectively. In the white area agglomeration is most likely (bimodal 
distribution), whereas in the dark area equidistribution is most likely (unimodal distri-
bution). In the right panels the stationary distributions computed at the corresponding 
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points A, B, and C are shown. In both figures these points have been obtained by keeping 
t fixed.
The right panel of figure 24.3 shows that moving from small to large values of I while 
keeping t fixed, the long- run distribution changes from bimodal to unimodal. This is 
because an increase in the number of residents I leads to a decrease in the marginal profit 
b (see 24.21). In fact, as a result of Assumption 4, the more residents there are, the more 
firms there are and the smaller the contribution of each firm’s locational decision to the 
profits of other firms, that is, the smaller the marginal profit. Changing I corresponds to 
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Figure 24.3  Entry–exit process for different values of the number of residents I. 
Left panel: A portion of the space (I, t) has been divided into the 
‘agglomeration’ area (white) and the ‘equidistribution’ area (shaded) 
according to Proposition 5. Right panel: Stationary geographical 
distributions computed at the points A, B, and C. Other parameters are  
a = 1, µ =0.5 and s = 4, whereas N is fixed by Assumption 4
Figure 24.4  Entry–exit process for different values of the fixed costs a. Left panel: A 
portion of the space (a, t) has been divided into the ‘agglomeration’ area 
(white) and the ‘equidistribution’ area (shaded) according to Proposition 
5. Right panel: Stationary geographical distributions computed at the points 
A, B, and C. Other parameters are I = 400, µ =0.5 and s = 4 whereas N is 
fixed by Assumption 4
M2297 - BOSCHMA PRINT.indd   522 11/5/10   15:14:41
A model of firms’ location with technological externalities   523
a sort of ‘size’ effect: increasing the size of the economy lowers the externalities so that, 
because of the entry–exit process, the likelihood of observing agglomeration is lowered.
The right panel of figure 24.4 shows that, keeping t fixed, an increase in the fixed 
cost parameter a leads, in general, to more agglomerated economies. it is so because 
an increase in a decreases the intrinsic profit a while increasing the marginal profit b. 
more precisely, a determines the scale of the profit differentials. Indeed, on the one 
hand, the difference between the maximum and the minimum profit is proportional to 
a and, on the other hand, because of assumption 4, the higher a the lower N, so that a 
bigger profit difference is caused by a lower number of firms. As a result, increasing fixed 
costs decreases the profit each firm earns irrespective of the presence of other firms, and 
increases the effect of each locational choice on the profits of others. Both effects go in 
the direction of increasing the likelihood of agglomeration. This is a sort of ‘scale’ effect 
where increasing the scale of profits increases the likelihood of agglomeration.
Concerning the effect of the transportation cost on the shape of the equilibrium dis-
tribution, notice that the expression ts−1/(1 + ts−1)2, which appears in (24.21) for both a 
and b, but with a different sign, is an increasing function of t. Thus, increasing the value 
of t leads to an increase in the marginal profit b and a decrease in the intrinsic profit a. 
This means that low transportation costs, that is, high values of t , favor agglomeration, 
while high transportation costs favor equidistribution. Indeed, when transportation 
costs are low, the pecuniary externality is relatively weak and the technological exter-
nality relatively strong. in terms of the entry–exit process, the choices of a relocate its 
activity has an high impact on the level of profits. Consequently, it is likely to trigger 
other relocations and, eventually, a strong agglomeration is observed. conversely, when 
transportation costs are high, the pecuniary and technological externalities almost offset 
each other. This implies that marginal profits are small and intrinsic profits dominate, 
so that each locational choice has a very small impact on the general level of profits. The 
attracting force of each location does not depend on the externality term and, given the 
symmetry of the two locations, equidistribution is likely to be observed.
5. Conclusion
We have analyzed a model of firms’ location in geographical space where firms interact 
both indirectly, through market interactions, and directly, through technological exter-
nalities, and where workers are not mobile. in this simple framework we have briefly 
discussed the general equilibrium static case, identifying the possible geographical 
equilibria, that is, the spatial distributions in which firms do not have any incentive to 
relocate their activities. We have showed that in this case the ‘cost sharing’ assumption 
implies long- run agglomeration, irrespective of the number of consumers, their prefer-
ences, and transportation costs. Then we have extended the analysis to include heteroge-
neity in firms’ preferences and an explicit time dynamics in their choices, thus obtaining 
a stochastic model of firms’ dynamics. We have been able to characterize the long- run 
geographical distribution of the process for different specifications of the economy. 
This analysis has revealed that, contrary to the static equilibrium analysis, when an 
explicit entry–exit dynamics is assumed to characterize the locational decision of firms, 
the economy can evolve towards two different long- run scenarios. In the first scenario, 
where externalities are stronger than intrinsic location profits, which typically occurs for 
low transportation costs, the long- run geographical distribution is bimodal with modes 
M2297 - BOSCHMA PRINT.indd   523 11/5/10   15:14:41
524  The handbook of evolutionary economic geography
at the extremal outcomes x = 0 and x = 1. Agglomeration is thus the most likely event 
but, as simulations show, this does not mean that once agglomeration on one side has 
been achieved, the situation is stable. In fact, turning points exist where the mass of firms 
moves from one location to the other. in the second scenario the long- run geographi-
cal distribution has a unique mode. In this case, the most likely occurrence is having 
half of the firms located in one region and the other half in the other region. However, 
because of the stochastic nature of the process, fluctuations around this average level are 
present. This scenario is typically associated with high transportation costs, and occurs, 
in general, when the effect of externalities is weak with respect to the intrinsic profit levels 
of each location.
Summarizing, the main contribution of the foregoing analysis is to show how firms’ 
heterogeneity and an individual choice process act as brakes or constraints on firms’ 
agglomeration, even when strong incentives to locate in already populous locations 
exist. moreover, having introduced an explicit time dimension, we have given history a 
role. Indeed the time dimension matters in two respects: first, the initial distribution of 
activities across two locations does influence the subsequent observed distributions and, 
second, when agglomeration is observed, because of stochastic fluctuations, it is only a 
metastable phenomenon. That is, by waiting long enough, the cluster eventually disap-
pears, just to be recreated soon after, with probability 1/2, in the other location.
Our model can be extended in several directions. First of all, the ‘cost sharing’ assump-
tion, while useful, is admittedly ad hoc. more careful modeling is probably needed. The 
effort should not be restricted to the notion of technological and/or knowledge spillover, 
which might even be characterized by a pecuniary nature, see, for example, antonelli 
(Chapter 7, this volume), but could encompass also other, possibly negative, sources 
of interactions that are not market mediated, like pollution and/or congestion effects. 
a second extension of the model would be to generalize consumers’ behavior along the 
same lines we followed to describe firms’ behavior. Whereas in the present version of 
the model consumers are homogeneous and maximize the same CES utility function, 
it would be interesting to assume that consumers are heterogeneous and to explicitly 
model their consumption decision in time. in that case, changing the size of the economy 
would imply, because of varying idiosyncrasies in consumers’ demand, a change in the 
amplitude of profit fluctuations. This, in turn, would impact the likelihood of observing 
agglomerated outcomes, probably reducing it.
in any case, we are aware that the ultimate test will be to confront our model with 
real data. an interesting aspect of the discrete choice model we implemented is that it 
leads quite easily to empirical applications. An exercise in this direction has already been 
performed in Bottazzi et al. (2008), where the parameters characterizing the geographi-
cal equilibrium distribution have been estimated in several sectors of the Italian manu-
facturing industry. The present work moves in the direction of developing a theoretical 
framework able to provide deeper and more informative economic interpretations of 
these econometric exercises.
Notes
* Thanks to the participants to the DIMETIC Summer School ‘Geography of Innovation and Growth’, Pecs, 
Hungary; the First DIME Scientific Conference, Strasbourg, France; and seminars given at the Universit`a 
degli Studi di Napoli ‘Parthenope’ and at the Scuola Superiore S’Anna, Pisa, Italy. The research that has 
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led to this work has been supported by the EU FP6 STREP Project CO3 Common Complex Collective 
Phenomena in Statistical Mechanics, Society, Economics, and Biology and by the European Union NoE 
dime. all usual disclaimers apply.
1. The generalization to different numbers of agents in each location will be considered in future work. 
Preliminary analysis shows that it doesn’t significantly modify the results.
2. This is the same condition found in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). See Bottazzi and Dindo (2008) for more 
details.
3. Technically our geographical equilibrium corresponds to a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the one 
shot game where each firm in a group of N has to choose whether to be located in 1 or in 2 and payoffs are 
given by profits.
4. In the terminology of Bottazzi and Secchi (2007) the intrinsic profit corresponds to the location’s ‘intrinsic 
attractiveness’, whereas the marginal profit is the ‘social externality’.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1
Average profits follow in a straightforward way by computing p 5 xp1 (x) 1 (1 2 x)p2 (x)  
with p1 (x)  and p2 (x)  as in (24.12) and in (24.17). Total costs in each location are equal 
because (24.14) implies:
 a
i51,n1
ai 5 a
j51,n2
aj 5
Na
2
Proof of Proposition 2
First, the unique distribution of firms where profits are equal is x = 0.5. Indeed taking 
profits as in (24.17), setting p1 (x)  equal to p2 (x) , gives a first order equation in x whose 
unique solution is x = 0.5.
Geographical equilibria are pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) of the one stage 
game where each firm in a group of N (N even), has to choose to be located in l =1 or l = 
2 and profits are given by (24.17). Denote the firm i = 1, . . ., N strategy as si. firm i can 
choose to locate either in 1, si = 1, or in 2, si = 0. The strategy space has thus 2N elements. 
A strategy profile will be denoted as s while s−i will denote the strategy profile of the N − 1 
firms apart from i. Define also:
 x(s) 5
a i51,. . .,Nsi
N
To complete the formalization of the game we have to specify each firm payoff for any 
strategy profile s. When si = 1, firm i payoff pi is given by:
 pi(1, s2i) ; p1 (x(s) )
where p1 (x)  is as in (24.17) and x(s) is defined above. When si = 0, firm i payoff is:
 pi(0, s2i) ; p2 (x(s) )
where p2 (x)  is again from (24.17). To give an example, if all firms choose location l = 
1, so that x = 1, one has pi 5 p1 (1)  for all i = 1,. . ., N. If, instead, half of the firms are 
located in l = 1 and the other half in l = 2, so that x =0.5, one has pi 5 p1 (0.5)  if si = 1 
and pi 5 p2 (0.5)  otherwise. A strategy profile s* is a PSNE if and only if:
 pi(s*i, s*2i) $ pi(si, s*2i)  for all si = 0, 1, i = 1,. . ., N (24A.1)
The only candidates to be PSNE are those strategy profiles s for which x(s) [ {0, 1, 0.5}. 
We start by showing that every s* such that x(s*)  = 1 or x(s*)  = 0 is a PSNE profile. 
From (24.17) it holds that p1 (1) . p2 (x)  for all x [ (0, 1)  and p2 (0) . p1 (x)  for all 
x [ (0,1) , so that (24A.1) is satisfied. Then consider a strategy profile s* such that 
x(s*) 5 x* 5 0.5. Given (24A.1), it is a PSNE if and only if:
 p1 (0.5) $ p2a0.5 2 1Nb4i 5 1, . . ., N (24A.2)
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 p2 (0.5) $ p1a0.5 1 1Nb4i 5 1, . . ., N (24A.3)
Since the two locations are identical and x is the share of firms choosing location 1, 
by symmetry it holds that p1 (x) 5 p2 (1 2 x) . using this relation we can rewrite both 
(24A.2) and (24A.3) as:
 p1 (0.5) $ p1a0.5 1 1Nb4i 5 1, . . ., N
The latter is satisfied if and only if the function p1 (x)  is not increasing at x = 0.5. Direct 
computation of dp1 (x) /dx 0x50.5 (see the following proofs for the explicit expression) 
shows that this is never the case, implying that the symmetric distribution is never a 
PSNE.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the Taylor expansion up to the first order of each term in (24.17) as a function 
of z = x − 0.5:
 p1 (z) 5 p1 (0.5) 1 z(2) la2aa1 2 ts211 1 ts21b
2
2 2ab 1 O(z2) , l 5 1, 2
using the expressions above to linearize exppl in (24.19), and writing them in terms of 
the number of firms nl, l =1, 2 we obtain the expressions of the linearized exponential 
payoff cl,
 c1 5 1 2 2aa (1 2 ts21) 2(1 1 ts21) 2 2 1b a
n1
N
2
1
2
b
 c2 5 1 1 2aa (1 2 ts21) 2(1 1 ts21) 2 2 1b a
1
2
2
n2
N
b
This shows that a and b are given by:
 a 5 1 1 aa (1 2 ts21) 2
(1 1 ts21) 2
2 1b
 b 5 2
2a
N
a (1 2 ts21) 2
(1 1 ts21) 2
2 1b
which, using assumption 4 to eliminate N, correspond to (24.21).
Proof of Proposition 5
From (24.22) it follows that the distribution is symmetric around N/2, that is 
p (N/2 1 n) 5 p (N/2 2 n)  for every n 5 0, . . ., N/2. Consequently it suffices to analyse 
the set {0,. . .,N/2}.
When a = b, qn (a, b)  reduces to n!. As a result the probability density becomes:
 p (n) 5 N!C
(N, a, b)
Z(N, a, b)
 4n,
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so that the distribution is uniform. The rest of the lemma will be proved by induction. 
first consider:
 p (0) _ p (1)
 
N!C(N, a, b)
Z(N, a, b)
 
1
N!
 qN(a, b) _
N!C(N, a, b)
Z(N, a, b)
 
1
(N 2 1) !
 q1 (a, b)qN21 (a, b)
   a(a 1 b) . . .(a 1 b(N 2 1) ) _ Na2 (a 1 b) . . .(a 1 b(N 2 2) )
 b _ a (24A.4)
Second consider:
 p (n) _ p (n 1 1)
 
N!C(N, a, b)
Z(N, a, b)
 
1
n! (N 2 n) !
 qn (a, b)qN2n (a, b)
 _
N!C(N, a, b)
Z(N, a, b)
 
1
(n 1 1) ! (N 2 n 2 1) !
 qn11 (a, b)qN2n21 (a, b)
 (n 1 1)a(a 1 b) . . .(a 1 b(n 2 1) )a(a 1 b) . . .(a 1 b(N 2 n 2 1) )
 _ (n 1 1)a(a 1 b) . . .(a 1 bn)a(a 1 b) . . .(a 1 b(N 2 n 2 2) )
 b(N 2 2n 2 1) _ B(N 2 2n 2 1)
 b _ a (24A.5)
where the last step requires n # N/2 2 1, which is our case. from 24a.4 and 24a.5 it 
follows that when b > a the maximum is in p (0)  (and by symmetry in p (N)), whereas, 
when b < a, the maximum is in p (N/2) .
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